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Since the beginning of market reforms in 1989, the countries of South-Eastern Europe 
(SEE) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have been trading 
significantly less with the world economy than those Central and Eastern European 
(CEE) countries which later joined the EU. To explain why this is the case, a number of 
hypotheses have been proposed in the literature. The key novelty of our study consists in 
a simultaneous assessment of the contribution to trade of geographical, policy and 
institutional factors during the EU pre-accession period (1997–2004). An augmented 
gravity model is proposed and estimated for a reference group of 82 countries, employing 
the Poisson and Tobit estimation techniques. We find that low quality of economic 
institutions in the SEE and CIS countries accounted for a considerable proportion of their 
below-potential international trade. We perform policy simulations using institutional 
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Nontechnical Summary 
The issue of international trade in the countries of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union 
following the start of market reforms in 1989 is the subject of growing empirical research. 
Formerly a relatively isolated trade bloc whose limited interactions with the world economy were 
based on state trading arrangements rather than market prices and decisions, the region as a whole 
now sends and receives more than two thirds of its goods and services to and from the rest of the 
world. The countries have also undergone radical policy changes, both in trade policy and in 
deeper institutional reforms. However, the expansion of international trade has not been uniform 
across countries. Trade with the rest of the world increased rapidly in those transition countries 
which later joined the European Union. In South-Eastern Europe (SEE) and in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the exposure to international trade has remained far 
smaller.  
There is a broad agreement that a combination of geographical, policy and other factors has 
contributed to these diverging patterns of trade. However, the relative importance of these 
different factors on international trade, when considered altogether, remains unclear. Therefore, 
the aim of this paper is to simultaneously identify geographical, political and institutional 
determinants of international trade in the SEE and CIS countries and, as a result, to answer what 
trade gains are to be expected from different policy measures. This is done within the gravity 
modelling framework, a method commonly used in the literature on the determinants of 
international trade.  
Our contribution to the literature consists in specifying and estimating an augmented gravity 
model and performing simultaneous testing for the importance in promoting trade of policy, 
institutional and geographical factors which have not received much attention to date. We have 
been able to collect variables which are specific to the economies in transition and which have 
been typically omitted in the past or captured by constant terms at best. These characteristics 
include, inter alia, restrictiveness of the trade regime, quality of countries’ institutions, and 
quality of infrastructure. Our analysis is thus based on one of the richest specifications found in 
the literature. Moreover, in our empirical analysis we employ recent estimation methods which 
correct for a number of biases.  
Overall, our results indicate that the international trade of the SEE and CIS countries is still below 
its potential, as predicted by macroeconomic fundamentals. The next question is how the situation 
can be improved. We use our best model estimates to conduct policy simulations to explore the 
potential for trade growth in the SEE and CIS countries stemming from the improvement of 
institutions, trade policies and regional agreements. The simulations indicate that improving the 
quality of institutions is one feasible road to follow. Moreover, improvements in infrastructure 
and opening-up to regional cooperation are complementary tools to stimulate the trade of the SEE 





Gravity isn’t easy, but it’s the law. 
Author unknown 
 
Following the start of deep political transformations and market reforms in 1989, the international 
trade of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU) 
experienced substantial changes as well. The process, known as the reorientation of trade “from 
East to West”, considerably altered the pattern and the intensity of trade flows. Formerly a 
relatively isolated trade bloc whose limited interactions with the world economy were based on 
state trading arrangements rather than market prices and decisions, the region as the whole now 
sends and receives more than two thirds of its goods and services to and from the rest of the 
world. Two decades after the beginning of the transition from a planned toward a market 
economy, the CEE and FSU countries have made considerable progress in many areas, including 
with trade policy and institutional reforms. The region, however, is far from becoming more 
homogeneous, including as regards exposure to international trade. Trade with the rest of the 
world has increased substantially in those transition countries which joined the European Union
1 
– the ratio of the CEE countries’ exports and imports to GDP had tripled from 20 per cent at the 
beginning of the 1990s to 60 per cent by the 2004 round of EU enlargement. International trade in 
the countries of South-Eastern Europe (SEE) and of the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) has altered to a much smaller extent: the corresponding change in the ratio of SEE exports 
and imports to GDP was from 20 to 30 per cent over the same period, while for the CIS region 
the numbers remained virtually unchanged at 20 per cent.  
These different patterns in international trade in transition countries have been the subject of a 
growing empirical literature. Interest has been focused on understanding the reasons why 
countries which started from fairly similar initial conditions (formerly centrally planned 
economies characterised by low exposure to international trade) experienced such different 
dynamics in trade patterns in the subsequent years. Early studies (see, for example, the two 
influential works by Hamilton and Winters, 1992, and Baldwin, 1994) predicted a rise in trade-to-
output ratios for both the CEE and FSU regions, with a somewhat higher increase for the CEECs 
due to their proximity to Western markets.  
Subsequently, along with progress in transition towards a market economy, growing differences 
among the CEE, SEE and CIS countries in terms of the dynamics and volumes of international 
trade contributed to a debate on the role played by geographical, political, institutional and other 
factors.
2 Geographical features are indeed important determinants of international trade. For 
example, longer distance from major markets and an absence of access to the sea represent 
                                                           
1 Eight of the 27 transition countries joined the EU in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia) and two more joined in 2007 (Bulgaria and Romania).  
2 See Landesmann and Szekely (1995), Kaminski (1996), Brenton and Gros (1997), Michalopoulos and Tarr 
(1997), Havrylyshyn and Al-Atrash (1998), Sheets and Boata (1998), Buch and Piazolo (2001), Djankov and 
Freud (2002), Fidrmuc and Fidrmuc (2003), EBRD (2003), Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and Maurel (2004), 
Freinkman et al. (2004), Broadman (2006), Bussiere et al. (2008), Caporale et al. (2009) and Rault et al. (2009). 
A detailed analysis of export reorientation in transition economies is provided by Kandogan (2006); for a study 
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obstacles to trade. However, these time-invariant factors alone cannot explain the changes in 
trade patterns over time. A number of studies stress the importance of free trade agreements 
(FTAs), also known as reciprocal trade agreements (RTAs).
3 Other studies highlight the role of 
transition-specific factors, which are difficult to measure.
4 
Two broad agreements emerge from the literature. First, it is a combination of country-specific 
political, institutional, geographical and other factors that has contributed to the differences in 
trade among transition countries. Second, SEE and particular CIS countries are found to trade 
below their potential. In other words, these countries’ volumes of total exports and imports are 
below their potential values as predicted on the basis of macroeconomic, geographical and other 
factors. However, it is still unclear what the relative contributions of these factors are in terms of 
the overall impact on international trade in transition economies.  
The key novel contribution of this paper consists in specifying and estimating an augmented 
gravity model which allows for simultaneous testing of the importance in promoting trade of 
policy, institutional and geographical factors which have not received much attention to date. We 
are able to collect and apply explicit control variables for factors specific to the economics of 
transition which have been omitted or at best addressed by the use of country-specific constant 
terms (Bussiere et al., 2008).  
Specifically, we test for the importance of trade regime (measured by the IMF’s trade 
restrictiveness index) separately from a country’s membership in a specific trade bloc or free 
trade area (FTA) as well as its membership in the World Trade Organisation (WTO). We also test 
the effect of the quality of country’s institutions, as measured by the World Bank governance 
indicators, up to 2008. In addition to these variables, we include a rich set of variables measuring 
geographical distance, the effect of borders, the quality of infrastructure and the volatility of the 
bilateral exchange rate. Our analysis is thus based on one of the richest specifications of the 
gravity equation found in the literature. Other contributions of this paper to the existing literature 
lie in choosing, for such a rich specification, a large reference sample of 82 countries over the EU 
pre-accession period 1997–2004, and in employing advanced estimation methods – the Poisson 
estimator and the Tobit estimator – to estimate the gravity equation for developing countries, with 
a focus on the SEE and CIS countries. 
We find that even after controlling for geographical, political and institutional factors, the 
international trade of the SEE and CIS economies with the world economy is still largely below 
its potential over the estimation period. Although trade has been significantly reoriented away 
from the former socialist trading bloc and towards western market economies over the past two 
decades, the SEE and CIS countries still trade much less than one might predict given their 
income levels and geographical location. Our estimations show that low quality of economic 
institutions in the SEE and CIS countries explains a considerable proportion of their below-
potential international trade. For SEE, the reasons need to be sought largely in relation to the past 
regional conflicts in the Balkans, while in the CIS, the main explanation of the underdevelopment 
                                                           
3 See Caporale et al. (2009) and Spies and Marques (2009) for recent evidence on the impact of FTAs on trade 
in transition economies. Cipollina and Salvatici (2010) present a meta-analysis of the effect of various trade 
agreements on bilateral trade based on an examination of evidence from 85 studies, including developed, 
developing and transition economies. 
4 See, e.g., Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) and Bussiere et al. (2008).   A Gravity Approach to Modelling International Trade...   5 
 
 
of international trade is the weakness of economic institutions. Moreover, the lack of regional 
cooperation, particularly in the Caucasus and in Central Asia, greatly increases transport and 
transit costs to world markets and is an obstacle to international trade. 
Our policy simulations indicate that for the landlocked economies of Central Asia, trade 
reorientation towards South and East Asia through additional infrastructure investments and trade 
facilitation measures is advisable. For those CIS and SEE countries without realistic EU 
accession prospects, a free trade area agreement with the EU and WTO membership offer the best 
policy prospects for promoting international trade. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the gravity approach to 
measuring obstacles to international trade, focusing on conceptual issues, modelling framework 
and estimation techniques. Section 3 presents the data, estimation results and policy simulations. 
Section 4 concludes with some thoughts on policies that might increase exposure to international 
trade for the SEE and CIS countries. 
2. A Gravity Approach to Measuring Obstacles to International Trade 
2.1 Conceptual Issues 
Empirical research on the determinants of international trade using gravity models has seen 
significant growth in recent years. Gravity models can be theoretically derived from different 
classes of trade theories, including factor-endowment theories (Deardorff, 1998), home 
preferences (“Armington preferences”, Anderson, 1979; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Spies 
and Marques, 2009), increasing returns to scale (Helpman and Krugman, 1985; Evenett and 
Keller, 2002), incomplete specialisation models (Cieslik, 2009) and a micro-founded general 
equilibrium framework (Novy, 2010). Empirical applications include the study of trade protection 
(Harrigan, 1993), exchange rate variability (Frankel and Wei, 1993; Lizardo, 2009; Chit et al., 
2010), currency unions (Rose, 2000; Frankel and Rose, 2002), regional versus multilateral trade 
agreements (Schiff and Winters, 2003; Rose, 2005; Subramanian and Wei, 2003; Cipollina and 
Salvatici, 2010
5), home bias (Whalley and Xin, 2009), democracy (Decker and Lim, 2009; Yu, 
2010), corruption (Musila and Sigue, 2010), development aid (Martinez-Zarzoso et al., 2009), 
cultural specificities (Felbermayr and Toubal, 2010; Tadesse and White, 2010) and institutional 
reforms and their impact on trade (Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and Maurel, 2004). 
This research has highlighted a number of specification and estimation issues. Anderson and van 
Wincoop (2003) derive a theoretical gravity equation and show that it is important to include 
country-specific trade resistance terms if unbiased coefficients are to be obtained. We choose a 
gravity equation with country-specific dummies to represent country-specific trade resistance. 
Moreover, the paper is one of the first applications to use Poisson estimation to account for biases 
in the trade of SEE and CIS countries introduced by the log-form of the gravity equation, while 
simultaneously correcting for the well-known problem of “missing trade” between two countries 
(see Santos Silva and Tenreyro, 2006). We also apply Tobit estimation as an alternative approach 
to dealing with missing trade. 
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It is important to note that this paper does not attempt to draw a link between the extent of 
international trade and measures of economic development such as income per capita or the 
growth rate of GDP. There is an ongoing debate about whether trade promotes economic growth 
or whether greater involvement in international trade is merely a correlate of growth and both are 
driven by improvements in the quality of domestic institutions supporting economic activity 
(Frankel and Romer, 1999; Rodrik et al., 2004; Dollar and Kraay, 2003). Our results are 
consistent with both possibilities. However, in emphasising the importance of behind-the-border 
issues (i.e. non-geographical determinants of trade), we lend support to those who do not regard 
opening of the trade regime as a recipe for improved economic prospects. 
In explaining bilateral trade intensity, one approach would be to define variables for each of the 
obstacles to trade and to introduce these directly in a regression of the ratio of trade to GDP. The 
introduction of regional dummies could then illustrate whether transition economies show a 
degree of openness that is significantly different from that in other regions when these obstacles 
are accounted for. This is essentially the approach followed by Freinkman et al. (2004). However, 
the trade barriers and transport and transit obstacles faced by traders depend very much on the 
trade route chosen and on the trading partner for the specific transaction. An aggregation to the 
level of a country’s total trade misses this important variation.
6 A gravity model explains the 
degree of bilateral trade between two countries, taking into account their location relative to each 
other, the nature of the trade route (e.g. how many borders need to be crossed, or how good the 
transport infrastructure is) and trade policies and institutional quality in both the home and the 
sending country. This is the approach pursued in this paper.  
2.2 Modelling Framework 
Our gravity equation specification is motivated by the theoretical framework proposed by 
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). This framework is based on a Constant-Elasticity of 
Substitution (CES) utility function and full specialisation of production across countries. The 
introduction of symmetric trade costs into the model leads to the well known gravity equation, 
whereby the level of bilateral trade between two countries is a function of their respective levels 
of income, a vector of transport and trade costs between them, and a measure of each country’s 
propensity to trade with all other countries. Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) call this 
“multilateral resistance”. In log-linear form, the model becomes: 
lnXijt = α + β lnYit + γ lnYjt + δ lnDistij + ζ Ci + η Cj        (1) 
where Xij are exports from country i to country j, Yi is GDP in country i. Distij is a vector of 
bilateral transport and trade obstacles, and Ci, Cj are the multilateral resistance terms. Given the 
panel structure of the data, time dummies are introduced to control for possible time effects.  
The model proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) imposes the constraint β=γ=1, but in 
many empirical applications this is relaxed. Moreover, allowing for non-homothetic preferences 
(an assumption of the theoretical gravity model) it additionally introduces the size of both 
countries’ populations into (1). For our purposes, the interest lies mainly in defining the vector 
Distij and the country-specific constants Ci and Cj. Many researchers have tried to approximate 
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the terms Ci, Cj with measures of a country’s remoteness from world markets, using a trade-
weighted average distance measure. As Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) argue, this is largely 
ad hoc. Instead, they suggest estimating (1) with non-linear methods, thereby expressing Ci, Cj as 
non-linear combinations of Yi, Yj and Distij, or replacing these terms simply with fixed country 
effects. We follow the latter route.  
We use the coefficient estimates from (1) to simulate the effect that changing the values of one of 
the elements of Distij would have on the average level of trade for a particular country or region.
7 
Specifically, we estimate the impact on trade of the transition economies in a hypothetical 
scenario where these countries adopt trade policies and institutions similar to those prevailing in 
the EU. The gravity estimates also allow inference on the additional gains for trade from WTO 
accession in those CIS countries which are not yet members (all SEE countries belong to the 
WTO) and from the formation of a free trade area between SEE or the CIS and the EU. Finally, 
we estimate the relative gains derived for the CIS from its higher density of transport 
infrastructure – one of the positive legacies of the Soviet Union – relative to other countries with 
similar levels of income (such as North Africa and the Middle East), and the potential for 
increased trade with South and East Asia for the countries of Central Asia once new trade routes 
are developed through China and Afghanistan.  
The elements of Distij are defined and the sources of data are given in Table 1. The elements are 
grouped in the following way:  
i)  Geographical distance – this is simply measured as the average distance between two 
countries, as represented by their capitals and assuming they are connected by a straight 
line (lnDistij). For large countries such as the USA, Canada and Russia several economic 
centres are accounted for. 
ii)  Exchange rate volatility –  this is defined as the standard deviation of the bilateral 
exchange rate between two countries, normalised by its mean (Volij). Yearly averages are 
calculated upon monthly dollar-denominated rates.
8  
iii)  Border effect – this has two components: a) a dummy for the existence of a common 
border between two countries, a variable used in many other studies (Contigij), and b) a 
variable measuring the number of borders between two countries (n_bordersij). 
iv)  Infrastructure – this is measured by the road and rail density in both the home and the 
partner country (DnInfrai;  DnInfraj), defined as the length of roads and railroads per 
square kilometre. In principle it might be possible to create a variable that measures the 
quality of infrastructure for each trade route DnRouteij, but this is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  
v)  Trade Policy – measured by WTO membership and a trade restrictiveness index 
constructed by the IMF. WTO membership is entered only when both countries are 
                                                           
7 In an earlier version of this paper, we chose a different route in trying to aggregate the multilateral resistance 
terms Ci, Cj by region to examine whether there are any unexplained trade gaps in the transition economies that 
could not be explained by the inclusion of a wide set of elements in the vector Distij. The estimates of Ci, Cj 
reveal some interesting cross-country patterns, but the regional aggregations are problematic since some country 
dummies are not significant. In the interest of brevity we have dropped this discussion from the revised version 
of this paper. See Bussiere, Fidrmuc and Schnatz (2008) for a similar approach.  
8 We also tried to estimate the effect of a common currency on bilateral trade, following Rose (2005). However, 
we were unable to retrieve significant effects. This was probably largely due to the smaller number of currency 
unions used in this paper, but may also reflect the fact that we introduce measures of institutional quality not 
used in Rose’s analysis. By setting Vol to zero we can nonetheless simulate the effect of a common currency on 
trade. 8   Oxana Babecká Kucharčuková, Jan Babecký and Martin Raiser 
 
   
members (following Rose, 2005). Trade policies are entered for both home (Imf_orit) and 
partner country (Imf_orjt). In addition, we control for the effect of Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) on bilateral trade flows, using the same set of FTAs as reported in Subramanian 
and Wei (2003).  
vi)  Institutions – measured by the average of the World Bank’s governance indicators for 
the rule of law, the extent of corruption and the quality of regulation.
9 The institution 
scores are entered separately for country i (WBit) and country j (WBjt).  
 
Despite the importance of FDI for transition economies, this variable is not included in the 
specification due to the endogeneity problem. However, there is substantial research on 
interactions between trade and investment as well as on the impact of institutions on investment. 
We also experimented with entering infrastructure, institutions and trade policies as a product of 
country i and country j on the basis that improvements in one country may be less effective in 
supporting trade if not accompanied by similar improvements in their trading partners.  
Overall, the results do not change much, but the significance of the interactive terms is affected 
by multicolinearity. We therefore stick to the additive specification for ease of interpretation. The 
specification is semi-logarithmic in form. This should be borne in mind in interpreting the 
coefficient sizes below.  
Note that while dummy variables to account for a common language and country pairs having 
been part of the same federation are often included in the gravity equation, the impact of these 
variables on trade is to a large extent already captured by regional dummies for the transition 
countries which are the focus of our paper, e.g. the CIS bloc/FSU (Russian being a common 
language) and SEE/former Yugoslavia. For this reason, the above-mentioned dummies are not 
considered in the paper. 
2.3 Estimation 
In proceeding to estimation, we face two problems. First, as pointed out by Santos Silva and 
Tenreyro (2006) the log-linear gravity equation specified in (1) is biased because of Jensen’s 
inequality:  () ( ) y E y E ln ln ≠ , which implies that in the presence of heteroscedasticity coefficients 
in the log-linearised specification will be biased.
10 In addition, OLS or fixed effects estimations 
assume non-zero trade between all pairs of countries, while in practice for some country pairs 
trade could be equal to zero. Traditionally, this problem has been handled by simply deleting all 
zero values, or setting all zero values to equal very small numbers instead. However, both 
procedures will lead to inconsistent estimates of (1). Pseudo-maximum likelihood estimation 
techniques such as Poisson regression allow us to correct biases resulting both from 
heteroscedastic errors and from missing trade between country pairs, Santos Silva and Tenreyro 
                                                           
9 The indicators can be found at www.worldbank.org/governance. It should be noted that these indicators are 
based on a wide range of different sources. However, for some of the transition economies, in particular those 
with weaker governance in Central Asia and in the Caucasus, the number of sources is still quite small, and the 
governance indicators hence rely on a small group of experts outside the country. As a growing number of 
enterprise surveys on the investment climate become available, and work continues on the construction of 
“objective” measures of business obstacles (e.g. the World Bank’s Doing Business Indicators), the governance 
indicators might be replaced with survey-based measures of institutional quality directly relevant to trade 
operations. As such measures become available, the findings in this paper should be subjected to further tests.  
10 It is quite plausible that the error term εijt in (2) is correlated with income and measures of Distij.    A Gravity Approach to Modelling International Trade...   9 
 
 
(2006) test this estimator against alternative techniques and find that it performs quite well even 
in the presence of measurement errors in the dependent variable.  
Alternatively, the gravity model can be estimated with binary or censored methods to account for 
missing trade. Ranjan and Tobias (2007) use the threshold Tobit estimator with a gravity model. 
Martin and Pham (2008) show that the Tobit model performs better than the Poisson estimator 
when the proportion of zero-trade flows is considerable. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2010) 
emphasise that in this particular case the maximum likelihood estimator may fail to converge. 
Thus, the authors propose a way of overcoming the problem using the coefficients from a log-log 
model as starting values. The dataset used in our paper contains less than 10% of missing values 
and all regressors are identified. This makes the Poisson estimator preferable to the Tobit model.  
To sum up, the advantage of the Poisson estimator as compared to the alternative binary 
techniques is that it allows for a continuous dependent variable. Moreover, compared to the 
censored models (Tobit estimators), the Poisson estimator allows for correction of another bias 
resulting in heteroscedastic standard errors due to the log-linear nature of the gravity equation. 
Correction for this bias is the key to conducting policy simulations, as we do in our study. 
This paper follows Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) and Tenreyro (2007) in applying Poisson 
estimation techniques to estimate the gravity equation, as they better model the behaviour of 
trade, constraining the trade volumes to be non-negative. In addition, the obtained coefficients are 
easier to use for the simulation exercise owing to the absence of Jensen’s inequality problem. The 
results differ significantly from simple OLS estimates, particularly in the size of the estimated 
coefficients on income levels and geographical distance, which suggests the biases that we 
attempt to correct are not trivial (the results are reported in the next section). For Poisson 
estimation, the basic model is specified in exponential form  ( ) i i i v x y + = β ' exp , which ensures 
that yi is non-negative. Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) show that under the assumption that the 
conditional variance is proportional to the conditional mean 
( () () () β ' exp | | i i i x x y E x y Var = = ), β can be estimated by maximising the following function: 









exp * max arg ~ β β β . The resulting Poisson estimator is consistent even if the 
underlying data for yi are not integers.  
We use a panel of bilateral trade flows to estimate the gravity model. In the case of a panel 
estimator εijt can be divided up into a fixed bilateral effect, a time-varying bilateral effect and 
white noise. A standard Hausman test did not reject the hypothesis of correlation between the 
fixed bilateral effect and the other regressors, implying that a fixed effects estimator should be 
used. This has the disadvantage that all time-invariant variables are dropped from the model.
11 
Instead, we proceed with estimation using a pooled cross section estimator and including both 
country and time-specific dummies.
12 For clarity, the difference between a fixed effects estimator 
and our approach is that the fixed effects in a gravity model are estimated for each bilateral pair 
of countries, whereas the country dummies we estimate average these bilateral effects across all 
                                                           
11 To resolve this inconvenience, we tried to apply a Hausman-Taylor estimator, but failed to obtain sufficiently 
strong instruments among the set of regressors. See Carrere (2006) for details on the Hausman-Taylor method in 
the context of a gravity panel estimation. 
12 An alternative approach is two-stage fixed effects estimation, where the country fixed effects are first 
retrieved from the baseline gravity estimation and then regressed in a second stage against time-invariant 
elements of Distij (see Bussiere, Fidrmuc and Schnatz, 2008).  10   Oxana Babecká Kucharčuková, Jan Babecký and Martin Raiser 
 
   
trading partners for each country, although we allow for two country dummies depending on 
whether a country is an exporter or an importer in the relationship.  
Finally, we should note that Poisson estimation does not eliminate the need to correct for 
heteroscedasticity, although it corrects the possible biases resulting from heteroscedastic error 
terms in log-linear specifications. We use Huber-White’s method to correct for heteroscedasticity, 




We collected data for 82 countries and for eight years of the EU pre-accession period (1997–
2004), yielding 47,684 observations. Our focus on the period from 1997 till 2004 is for three 
reasons: i) To focus on the effects of EU accession on international trade. Data for earlier years 
are incomplete for SEE and the CIS and thus our analysis starts in 1997. Furthermore, only the 
period up to but not beyond the completion of the accession process in CEE is considered here. 
This sample allows us to have a similar group of countries (formerly transition economies), some 
of which have prospects of joining the EU while the others do not (CIS countries). ii) To bring 
value added to the existing literature by assessing the simultaneous impact on trade of 
geographical, institutional and policy factors. To our knowledge, as of August 2010, there is no 
study on the determinants of trade in the SEE/CIS countries using a sample going beyond 2004 
(with one exception – Caporale et al., 2009, who examine the period 1987/1991–2005. However, 
this study does not use such a reach specification as in our study. Furthermore, Caporale et al. 
(2009) employ fixed and random effect estimation techniques, which are subject to bias in the 
case of zero/missing trade between country pairs); iii) Examination of the effects of the 
2008/2009 crisis is left for future research. For the above reasons the sample stops in 2004. 
 We exclude countries from Sub-Saharan Africa because of incomplete data on trade and several 
other variables used in our estimations. The sample represents roughly 95 per cent of world GDP 
and 82 per cent of total worldwide trade flows, and includes all major economies in emerging 
Asia, Latin America, as well as all OECD countries, in addition to the 27 countries of Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union (see Annex 1 for a complete list of countries).  
3.2 Estimations 
The econometric specification for the full model in exponential form is: 
Xijt = exp(α1ln(GDP_ppp)it + α2ln(GDP_ppp)jt + α3ln(Pop)it + α4ln(Pop)jt + α5Volijt + 
α6ln(Dist)ij + α7DnInfrai + α8DnInfraj + α9 Contigij + α10Nbordersij + α11FTAijt + 
α12WTOijt + α13Imf_orit + α14Imf_orjt + α15WBit + α16WBjt + α17Ci + α18Cj)+ εijt,        (2) 
where exp is the exponent, ln stands for the log operator, the t subscript indicates time and all 
variables are defined as in Table 1. Note that the infrastructure and border effects (variables 
DnInfrai, DnInfraj and Contigij, Nbordersij respectively) are constant over time, while trade policy 
and institutional quality variables are time-dependent. The constant terms Ci and Cj above are   A Gravity Approach to Modelling International Trade...   11 
 
 
approximated by country dummies (two for each country, depending on whether it is the exporter 
or the importer in the bilateral trade flow Xij).  
Table 2 reports the regression results of the full model in (2) for the period 1997–2004, estimated 
for six alternative specifications. Our preferable specification estimated with the pseudo-ML 
Poisson estimator is in column 4. The specifications in other columns serve to illustrate the 
potential biases introduced by OLS estimation (columns 1–2), Tobit estimation (column 3) and 
Poisson estimation when trade is restricted to positive values (column 5) and when multilateral 
resistance terms are omitted (column 6).  
All regressions except column 6 are estimated with exporter and importer fixed effects. The 
regression in column 6 contains time dummies. Columns 1 and 2 show the basic regression 
results, estimated by OLS. The estimates in column 2 are obtained for the case when missing 
bilateral trade is replaced by unity values.  
The results in column 4 conform to prior expectations. The elasticity of trade with respect to GDP 
is close to unity, as required by the model in Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). The Wald test 
rejects the restriction of the unitary coefficient on GDP at the 5 per cent significance level for the 
OLS and Tobit regressions. For the Poisson specifications in columns 4 to 6 the coefficient on 
GDP is not significantly different from unity. The coefficient on population is not statistically 
significant, although this depends on the specification chosen. Based on a comparison of the 
results in columns 5–6 it seems that the country-level multilateral resistance terms are correlated 
with country size and capture most of the explanatory power of the population variable. Exchange 
rate volatility has a significant negative impact on bilateral trade volumes as expected.  
The coefficients of regression 4 are broadly in line with the Tobit regression (Column 3). The 
main difference is in the bloc geography. Distance has a much larger effect on trade in the Tobit 
regression. The impact of distance, however, is outweighed by the insignificant coefficient on the 
number of borders. Therefore, the total impact of geography on trade should be comparable with 
the Poisson regression in column 4. The Tobit regression is designed for a binary dependent 
variable. Furthermore, it has considerably lower R2 compared to the other specifications. For 
these reasons, the Poisson regression presented in column 4 is used for the simulations. 
While bilateral GDP represents a dominant determinant of trade (which is not surprising, since by 
definition net exports are part of GDP), the effects of policy, institutional and geographical 
variables are also important. Turning to the various trade and transport obstacles, geographical 
distance exerts a strongly negative effect on bilateral trade flows. A 1 per cent increase in 
distance reduces trade by around 0.6 per cent in our estimations, which is within the range 
obtained by other studies. A common border increases bilateral trade by around 60 per cent, and 
for each additional border that goods need to cross trade declines by another 15 per cent. This is 
around half the value of the estimates in Raballand (2003) and in Bussiere, Fidrmuc and Schnatz 
(2008), but in line with the magnitudes found by Anderson and van Wincoop (2003). Road and 
rail density varies in our sample between a low of around 0.1 kilometre per one square kilometre 
in North Africa and the Middle East and a high of around 1.3 in the EU. This difference accounts 
for a less than 10 per cent difference in the total trade of country i or country j. The impact of 
infrastructure on trade is, therefore, significant but quantitatively not so important (according to 
the close-to-zero coefficients in Table 2).  12   Oxana Babecká Kucharčuková, Jan Babecký and Martin Raiser 
 
   
More liberal trade policies contribute to greater integration. Trade between two WTO members 
is, other things being equal, around 50 per cent higher (calculated as (exp(coefficient) -1)*100) 
than trade between non-members. This is similar in magnitude to the estimates in Subramanian 
and Wei (2003) for industrial WTO member countries. Joint membership in an FTA also boosts 
bilateral trade by around 120 per cent in our sample, which is higher than the quantitative 
estimates in Subramanian and Wei (2003) of around 80 per cent. Compared to the impact of 
WTO or FTA membership, trade liberalisation – measured by the IMF index – has a much 
smaller impact. Moreover it is significant only for the importing country (Imf_orj). The IMF 
index ranges from 1 (fully liberal) to 10 (fully restrictive). According to our estimates, the 
difference between a fully liberal and a fully restrictive trade regime would account for a 30 per 
cent difference in imports into country j. Although the quantitative effect is not very large the 
asymmetry between exporting and importing countries in the impact of trade liberalisation is 
interesting. Trade theory generally assumes that import taxes are equivalent to export taxes by 
raising the costs of tradable inputs into the export production process.  
By and large, our results indicate significant potential benefits from trade liberalisation in the 
context of regional or multilateral agreements, with little additional explanatory power offered by 
the nature of a country’s own trade regime. We posit that this is due to the considerable discipline 
imparted by recent regional trade agreements and by WTO membership on countries’ trade 
policies. Fifteen or twenty years ago, when implementation was sketchy and exceptions were the 
rule, trade policy may have had a larger impact, and WTO membership and membership in an 
FTA a smaller impact. Unfortunately, the IMF data series does not extend prior to 1997. 
The impact of institutional quality on trade flows is also sizeable. A one point increase in the 
average governance score (which ranges from –2.5 to +2.5) leads to a 15 per cent increase in 
exports from country i and a 40 per cent increase in imports into country j. The asymmetry 
parallels the findings for trade liberalisation. We have no obvious explanation for this. One 
possibility may be that the quality of institutions matters more for importers because it is the 
credibility of the contractual regime in the buyer’s country that determines the propensity of 
suppliers to enter into exchange. This would be the case if exporters provide trade credit to 
importers, for instance, or rely on local bank guarantees to finance trade.  
3.3 Policy Simulations 
The above results can help us to account for the different extent of international integration in 
CEE, SEE and the CIS. We illustrate this using a set of simulations contained in Table 3 (Annex 
2 contains detailed methodological notes on the simulations carried out). All these simulations are 
based on the regression results in column 4 of Table 2.
13 First, we explore the impact of 
institutional reforms, approximated by improvements in the Wbi and Wbj variables up to the 
average level in the EU, for two periods, in 2004 and 2008. This benchmark is certainly relevant 
for CEE and for SEE; for the CIS other benchmarks may be more appropriate, but we stick to the 
                                                           
13 Possible determinants of or impediments to trade integration are introduced simultaneously in order to avoid 
omitted variable bias. The inconvenience of this approach is that it is impossible to control for all possible 
interactions among the explanatory variables in the model. An alternative technique would be to put the 
determinants into the regression one by one and to compare the respective changes in the coefficients of the 
variables in question. Such an approach is applied in Babetskii et al. (2003), whose results are broadly in line 
with the present estimates with regard to the relative importance of the various determinants.    A Gravity Approach to Modelling International Trade...   13 
 
 
EU for ease of comparison. In 2004 the average scores on institutional quality for CEE, SEE and 
the CIS are 0.75, 0.29 and -0.95 respectively, relative to the EU15’s average score of 1.55 (max. 
2.5; min. -2.5). This results in potential trade gains from achieving the same institutional quality 
as in the EU in 2004 of around 50 per cent in CEE, 150 per cent in SEE and 230 per cent in the 
CIS. The gap between the best performer Estonia (26.4 per cent), which would achieve only 
modest additional gains from institutional reforms, and the worst performer Turkmenistan is a 
staggering 300 per cent. When using the EU15 average institutional quality in 2008 as the 
benchmark, the potential trade gains are lower for all considered cases except the Kyrgyz 
Republic (a rise from 190 per cent to 217 per cent). The overall decrease in the trade gain in 2008 
as compared to 2004 is due to an increase in the average values of institutional quality in 
transition economies. As a result, with catching-up with the EU15, the differences in institutions 
become smaller, hence the trade gain diminishes. On the contrary, as institutions in the Kyrgyz 
Republic worsened in 2008 compared to 2004, this is reflected by a higher trade gain upon the 
hypothetical adoption of the EU15 average institutional value.  
Second, we examine the impact of trade liberalisation, as reflected by the IMF trade 
restrictiveness index. Again we choose the EU as a benchmark, although it should be noted that 
the EU actually scores relatively poorly on this index, with a score of 4, considerably above the 
scores for some of the CEE countries pre-accession. Because CEE had to adopt the EU’s trade 
policies and external tariff upon joining the enlarged EU, we do not consider them in this 
simulation. For SEE, the gains from further trade liberalisation on average are insignificant: just 
0.1 per cent. Even for the CIS, the gains are small, at 5.4 per cent on average. Uzbekistan, the 
country with the most restrictive trade regime according to the IMF, would achieve a 24 per cent 
increase in trade levels from adopting EU-type trade policies. However, we should emphasise that 
these magnitudes reflect the marginal impact of trade liberalisation, net of the effect of WTO 
membership and membership in a free trade area. 
Next we look at the impact of the transition economies joining an FTA with the EU. Among the 
SEE countries, Bulgaria, Romania and, since 2001 and 2002 respectively, Macedonia and Croatia 
have FTAs with the EU15. We therefore concentrate on the results for Albania, Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro. We simulate the impact of an FTA with the enlarged EU25 
(for those countries which already have FTAs with the EU15, enlargement adds only modest 
additional trade opportunities given the dominance of the EU15 in trade patterns of SEE relative 
to CEE). Among the CIS countries, FTAs have been under discussion with Ukraine, Russia and 
the Southern Caucasus. Formally, the CIS is in itself an FTA, so any one CIS country joining an 
FTA with the EU would entail complicated rules of origin procedures for the rest of the CIS, 
which would be difficult to enforce. For illustration purposes we focus on the case of Ukraine and 
on the CIS as a whole. 
 For Ukraine, the EU25 accounts for around one third of its total trade; for the CIS, the average 
share is around half. Consequently, the trade gains from an FTA for Ukraine would be 45 per 
cent, compared to 66 per cent for the CIS on average. For comparison, Albania’s and Serbia and 
Montenegro’s trade is expected to increase by about 90 per cent. For Bosnia and Herzegovina the 
respective trade gains equal 67 per cent. These numbers are huge and reflect both the significant 
impact that FTA membership exerts on bilateral trade flows in our gravity model and the large 
share of the EU in the foreign trade of the CIS and SEE. 14   Oxana Babecká Kucharčuková, Jan Babecký and Martin Raiser 
 
   
WTO accession is mainly an issue for the CIS countries. In the SEE bloc only two countries, 
namely Serbia and Montenegro
14 and Bosnia and Herzegovina, do not have WTO membership. In 
contrast, among the CIS, only Armenia, Georgia, the Kyrgyz Republic and Moldova are WTO 
members. For the remaining seven countries, the gains from membership depend on whether they 
trade primarily with WTO members or with non-members, since the WTO dummy is specified to 
account for the effect on trade if both trading partners are WTO members. On average, CIS trade 
with WTO members amounts to around 85 per cent of total trade. Including all intra-CIS trade, 
this rises to 96 per cent, so that if all CIS countries joined the WTO at once, their collective trade 
would increase by close to 50 per cent. If they joined independently, the gains would be lower, 
ranging between 18 per cent for Belarus and 45 per cent for Russia depending on the weight of 
intra-CIS in the total trade of each country. It should be noted that the EU has made it clear that it 
will not consider FTA arrangements with countries in the region which are not in the WTO. In 
this sense, these simulations present a wrong juxtaposition. The combined effect of WTO 
membership and an FTA agreement with the EU is clearly potentially very large (although in 
reality somewhat dependent on how broadly the FTA is structured – i.e. to what extent it covers 
agriculture and other sensitive goods).  
Table 3 contains three further simulations (see also Annex 2 for a technical note). The first 
estimates the impact on total trade of selected CIS countries from having a common border with 
the EU as a result of enlargement. This impact is the sum of the impact of having a common 
border and the reduction in the number of borders with the EU. We concentrate on the trade gains 
for Europe’s “new neighbours”, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine, as well as Croatia and Serbia, 
who have also become neighbours of the EU as a result of enlargement. The highest increase in 
trade is obtained for Croatia (45.5 per cent). The trade gains for Belarus, Ukraine and Serbia and 
Montenegro are between 20 and 30 per cent. Moldova did not benefit much from the first wave of 
enlargement, since it did not have a common border with the EU during the time period under 
study. With Romania and Bulgaria’s accession in January 2007, this has obviously changed. The 
second round of EU enlargement generates trade gains of 34.6 per cent for Moldova according to 
our estimates, compared to a close-to-zero gain for the first wave of enlargement.  
The second is an estimate of the gains for SEE and the CIS from the Soviet legacy of relatively 
high investment in physical transport infrastructure. As our comparator in this case we choose 
North Africa and the Middle East, comparable in terms of average per capita incomes. The higher 
density of roads and railways in SEE and the CIS relative to this region accounts for a 10 and 5 
per cent difference in total trade levels, a modest amount. In Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan the 
infrastructure density on average is even lower than in North Africa, highlighting urgent 
investment needs.  
The third simulation uses the gravity equation to look at the potential reorientation of trade in 
Central Asia towards South and East Asia following the end of the civil war in Afghanistan and 
investments in new trade routes south towards the Persian Gulf and East to the Chinese province 
of Xinjiang. In trade-weighted terms, Central Asia’s potential trade with South and East Asia is 
around three times larger than its actual trade, with the potential trade gains ranging from 450 
times with the Philippines, where actual trade is only 0.2 per cent of its potential level, to around 
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two times with China and Korea. Trade with India, Pakistan and Japan currently reaches only 10–
12 per cent of its potential level. 
Finally, an interesting simulation concerns the potential impact of adopting the euro on trade in 
the new member states (CEE). Because exchange rates were relatively stable over the estimation 
period, setting exchange rate volatility to zero for the CEE generates only a 1.3 per cent gain in 
trade.  
 
4. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Our main finding suggests that the low quality of institutions in many SEE and CIS countries 
represents the biggest obstacle to greater trade integration. Indeed, were the CIS countries to 
achieve the same institutional quality as the EU, their total trade would increase by 230 per cent, 
while for SEE the increase would be 150 per cent. Trade liberalisation is important in some CIS 
countries, which maintain restrictive policies to date, although the weight of trade liberalisation 
depends on the specification used (it is of little importance in our preferred specification). WTO 
membership influences trade positively, but, on average, by less than membership in a free trade 
area. Geographical disadvantages resulting from distance to major markets and from 
landlockedness for some of the CIS countries, particularly in Central Asia, are quantitatively less 
important than weaknesses related to the quality of institutions or the quality of infrastructure.  
Our results are in line with the arguments presented in Broadman (2006), but in contrast to this 
comprehensive study we are able to demonstrate the importance of non-geographical 
determinants of trade in a unified framework that controls simultaneously for border effects, 
institutions, infrastructure and other factors. Our findings also support the position of Berkowitz 
et al. (2006), who argue that a country’s ability to benefit from globalisation depends on the 
quality of its legal framework for contract enforcement (see also Aghion et al., 2005, and Rodrik, 
2002 for related arguments). Babetskaia-Kukharchuk and Maurel (2004) also argue that 
institutions are the key to increasing integration of the CIS into the world economy, but their 
results are based on a much smaller sample, a simpler specification and a different measure of 
institutional quality.
15  
There has been much debate about the potential role of the WTO as an anchor for institutional 
reform. This role would be reinforced if institutional issues were to be tied to progress in 
multilateral trade liberalisation under the WTO, as suggested for instance by the EU. The EU is 
also planning to use the incentive of greater market access as an anchor to promote deeper 
institutional reforms in SEE and in the CIS. Our results suggest that WTO membership could 
give a significant boost to trade in the CIS, a boost that would be reinforced if it goes hand in 
hand with improvements in institutional quality. Furthermore, the creation of an FTA between the 
EU and the CIS would create even greater trade gains for the latter, providing significant 
incentives to adopt EU market rules and regulations in order to be granted access to the EU 
market. Against such harmonisation, it may be argued that it would lead to the importation of 
inappropriate institutions to the SEE and CIS countries, particularly without the ultimate prospect 
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of membership in the common market. This may be true in some areas, and yet the experience of 
the new member states suggests that there are huge potential gains for SEE and the CIS in 
harmonising their regulatory framework with that of the EU in return for greater market access. 
Our results on WTO accession and on the role of FTAs are consistent with the findings of 
Subramanian and Wei (2003), who argue that WTO accession since the Uruguay round has 
promoted trade, whereas this was not the case in the previous rounds for most developing 
countries. 
Landlockedness plays an important role in our estimates of international trade.
16 This paper 
suggests that, while important, geographical obstacles are not the primary constraints for greater 
integration of this remote region. However, in one simulation using our basic gravity 
specification, we find that there is huge potential to increase Central Asia’s trade with South Asia, 
in particular India and Pakistan. Realising this potential will, inter alia, require significant 
additional investments in transport infrastructure and improved border management (Byrd et al., 
2006). For Central Asia in particular, the fact that several borders need to be crossed to gain 
access to its main markets is an important drawback. The only major markets for which this is not 
the case are China and Russia, which may explain the rapid growth in trade with the former and 
the reintegration under way with the latter. At the same time, countries like Belarus, Moldova and 
Ukraine should benefit significantly from the fact that they face only one border between them 
and the EU market. For Belarus and Ukraine, for instance, the current share of trade with the EU 
is still well below the level predicted by our gravity equation, implying unexploited trade 
potential. However, while borders matter, this is not mainly because of weak transport links. 
Instead what is needed is greater attention to trade facilitation measures, such as customs 
harmonisation, enforcement of the TIR convention, road axle load regulations and visa 
regulations for foreign truck drivers. 
What can be done to increase international trade in the non-accession countries? This paper 
contributes to uncovering the factors that are needed for countries to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by the process of international integration. Turning these findings into 
policy actions is a difficult challenge but one that will bear rich fruit. The results in this paper 
indicate that institutional reforms are key. Our results suggest that the returns to such reforms 





                                                           
16 Several studies have emphasised the geographical and border-related obstacles to trade (Limao and Venables, 
2001; Gallup et al., 1999; and specifically for the countries of Central Asia, Raballand, 2003; Raballand et al., 
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Appendix  
 
Table 1: Data Description and Sources 













Log of bilateral trade 
(export of country i 
to country j),  
Exports -  US$ 
million     IMF-DOTS 
LnGDP_pppi 
LnGDP for country i, 
GDP in PPP, US$ 
million      WDI 
LnGDP_pppj 
LnGDP for country j, 
GDP in PPP, US$ 
million     WDI 
LnPOPi 
Log of population in 
country i, POP - 
millions of people     WDI 
LnPOPj 
Log of population in 
country j, POP - 
millions of people   WDI 
Volij 
Bilateral exchange 








Log of bilateral 
distance    www.cepii.fr 
Contigij 
Dummy for common 




World Factbook  
Border effects 
Nbordersij 
Number of borders 
to cross to reach 
partner country  equal to [0, 1, 2, or 3] 
Authors’ 
calculation using 
World Factbook  
DnInfrai 
Density of roads and 
railroads (length per 
square kilometre) in 





World Factbook  
Infrastructure 
DnInfraj 
Density of roads and 
railroads (length per 






World Factbook  
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Table 1: (continued): Data Description and Sources 
 
Group Variable Description Formulas  Source 
WTO 
Dummy for WTO 
membership (both 
are WTO members)
1 if both are WTO 
members; 0 otherwise 
Authors’ 
calculation using 
WTO web site 
FTA  Dummy for FTA 
1 if there is an FTA 








index. Country i’s 
Overall Rating  
ranges from 1 to 10; higher 
values mean more 








index. Country j’s 
Overall Rating 
ranges from 1 to 10; higher 
values mean more 





Average of WB inst. 
(corruption, rule of 
law, regulation 
quality) for country i
wbi=(wb_ci+wb_rli+wb_rqi)/3; 






Average of WB inst. 
(corruption, rule of 
law, regulation 
quality) for country j
wbj=(wb_cj+wb_rlj+wb_rqj)/3; 
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Table 2: Regression Results, Full Model 
Reg.number:  1     2    3   
4 - 
preferable    5     6   
Restrictions    
including 
Xij=0          Xij>0    no FEi & FEj  
Estimation by  OLS     OLS   Tobit  Poisson   Poisson      Poisson  
lngdp_pppi 1.16  ***  0.67 *** 0.67 ***  0.85 *** 1.11  ***  0.96 *** 
 (0.06)    (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.12)   (0.16)    (0.04)  
lngdp_pppj 0.76  ***  0.51 *** 0.51 ***  0.95 *** 1.16  ***  1.01 *** 
 (0.05)    (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.14)   (0.19)    (0.04)  
lnpopi 0.02    0.24 *** 0.24 ***  0.03   -0.39  **  -0.15 *** 
 (0.06)    (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.13)   (0.18)    (0.04)  
lnpopj 0.13  **  0.20 *** 0.20 ***  -0.15   -0.64  ***  -0.17 *** 
 (0.06)    (0.04)   (0.04)   (0.14)   (0.19)    (0.04)  
vol  -0.05   -0.09 *  -0.09 *  -0.31 ** 0.16    0.04  
 (0.08)    (0.06)   (0.06)   (0.14)   (0.15)    (0.15)  
lndist -1.38  ***  -1.10 *** -1.10 ***  -0.55 *** -0.23  ***  -0.40 *** 
 (0.01)    (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)    (0.03)  
contig 0.86  ***  0.82 *** 0.82 ***  0.55 *** 1.41  ***  0.81 *** 
 (0.04)    (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.03)   (0.05)    (0.05)  
nborders_ij 0.13  ***  0.01   0.01   -0.15 *** 0.81  ***  -0.04 * 
 (0.03)    (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.08)    (0.02)  
dninfrai 0.00  ***  0.00 *** 0.00 ***  0.00   0.00  ***  0.00 *** 
 (0.00)    (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)    (0.00)  
dninfraj 0.00  ***  0.00 *** 0.00 ***  0.00 *** 0.00  **  0.00 *** 
 (0.00)    (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)    (0.00)  
WTO 0.47  ***  0.36 *** 0.36 ***  0.41 *** 0.29  ***  -0.03  
 (0.03)    (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.04)   (0.08)    (0.04)  
FTA 0.51  ***  0.50 *** 0.50 ***  0.80 *** 0.98  ***  0.49 *** 
 (0.02)    (0.02)   (0.02)   (0.03)   (0.06)    (0.06)  
imf_ori 0.01    0.00   0.00   -0.01   -0.01    -0.10 *** 
 (0.01)    (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)    (0.01)  
imf_orj -0.03  ***  -0.02 *** -0.02 ***  -0.03 *  -0.02    -0.12 *** 
 (0.01)    (0.01)   (0.01)   (0.02)   (0.02)    (0.01)  
wbi 0.17  ***  0.14 *** 0.14 ***  0.15 *  0.04    0.09 ** 
 (0.06)    (0.05)   (0.04)   (0.09)   (0.14)    (0.04)  
wbj 0.44  ***  0.35 *** 0.35 ***  0.42 *** 0.29  **  0.21 *** 
   (0.06)     (0.04)    (0.04)    (0.09)    (0.13)     (0.03)   
_cons -10.07  ***  -2.94 *** -2.94 ***  -13.24 *** -21.23  ***  -14.19 *** 
   (0.70)     (0.48)    (0.48)    (1.90)    (2.50)     (0.71)   
Number of obs  47684    47684   47684   47684   53303    47684  
Test Wald / F test  1117    1644   1651   183836   127750    36748  
Prob > chi2 or F  0    0   0   0   0    0  
Pseudo R2 or R2  0.80     0.83    0.37    0.94    0.90     0.89   
Notes: All specifications include exporter and importer fixed effects. Column 4 is our preferable 
specification based on which the policy simulations are conducted. 
 
Standard errors corrected for heteroscedasticity are in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote 1%, 5% 
and 10% significance levels respectively. Time and country dummies are not reported. 
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Table 3: Simulating the Impact of Different Variables on Trade in the Transition Economies 























































































































































































































    
               
Selected country simulations              
Azerbaijan  209.1  192.6  -3.0 39.0 58.1      8.4    
Belarus  283.9  235.3  17.4  17.9 36.5 27.6 27.6  9.7    
Kazakhstan  232.3  193.0  5.3  34.4      -0.3  34.0   
Kyrgyz Rep.  190.3  217.3  -3.0       1.5  39.1   
Moldova  189.4  161.1  5.3    42.4 0.3 34.6  13.0    
Tajikistan  255.5  237.6  -3.0  28.2      2.8  8.4   
Turkmenistan  340.1  322.2  14.3  22.1      -0.9  7.3   
Ukraine  197.9  178.0  5.3  31.8 45.0 20.2 20.2  8.6    
Uzbekistan  317.7  266.8  24.0  28.9      2.3  36.1   
              
Croatia   105.0  92.5  -3.0     45.5  45.5  10.8    
Serbia and 
Montenegro  186.1 135.8 8.2  50.0  89.0 29.2  29.2 10.1    
Notes:  Simulations based on the coefficients from model 4 in Table 2. Insignificant coefficients have been 
set to zero. 
* These estimates show how distant actual trade is from its potential level, which is equal to 100%. 
For figures below 100% an increase in trade is expected, and for figures above 100% a decrease in 
trade is expected.  
** For five countries of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Rep., Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan) 
Regional 
Simulations   
 
    
 
    
CEE  53.2  48.2           1.3 
SEE  148.1  120.2  0.1       10.0    
CIS  230.2  205.1  5.4  48.9 65.8      5.2  30.5**  24   Oxana Babecká Kucharčuková, Jan Babecký and Martin Raiser 
 
   
ANNEX 1:  List of Countries  
EU-15 (15)       SEE (7)    
country     ____  country    
Austria   AUT     Albania  ALB 
Belgium   BEL     Bosnia & Herzegovina  BIH 
Denmark   DNK     Bulgaria   BGR 
Finland   FIN     Croatia   HRV 
France   FRA     Macedonia, FYR  MKD 
Germany   DEU     Romania   ROU 
Greece   GRC     Serbia & Montenegro  SCG 
Ireland   IRL    CIS (12)    
Italy   ITA     country    
Luxembourg   LUX     Armenia   ARM 
Netherlands   NLD     Azerbaijan, Rep. of  AZE 
Portugal   PRT     Belarus   BLR 
Spain   ESP     Georgia   GEO 
Sweden   SWE     Kazakhstan   KAZ 
United Kingdom   GBR     Kyrgyz Republic   KGZ 
CEE (8)        Moldova   MDA 
country        Russia   RUS 
Czech Republic   CZE     Tajikistan   TJK 
Estonia   EST     Turkmenistan   TKM 
Hungary   HUN     Ukraine   UKR 
Latvia   LVA     Uzbekistan   UZB 
Lithuania   LTU    NAFTA (3)    
Poland   POL     country    
Slovak Republic   SVK     Canada   CAN 
Slovenia   SVN     Mexico   MEX 
S.Am (7)        United States   USA  
country       N.Af.M.East (10)    
Argentina   ARG     country    
Bolivia   BOL     Algeria   DZA 
Brazil   BRA     Cyprus   CYP 
Ecuador   ECU     Egypt   EGY 
Paraguay   PRY     Iran, I.R. of  IRN 
Uruguay   URY     Israel   ISR 
Venezuela, Rep. Bol.  VEN     Morocco   MAR 
OCE (2)        Saudi Arabia   SAU 
country      Tunisia   TUN 
Australia   AUS     Turkey   TUR 
New Zealand   NZL     United Arab Emirates   ARE 
E.S-E.ASIA (9)       S.ASIA (4)    
country        country  
China, P.R.: Mainland  CHN     Bangladesh   BGD 
Indonesia   IDN     India   IND  
Japan   JPN     Nepal   NPL 
Korea   KOR     Pakistan   PAK 
Malaysia   MYS    OTHERS (5)    
Philippines   PHL     country  
Singapore   SGP     Iceland   ISL 
Thailand   THA     Malta   MLT 
Vietnam   VNM     Mongolia   MNG 
       Norway   NOR 
       Switzerland   CHE 
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ANNEX 2: Explanatory Note to Simulation Results in Table 3 
In order to estimate changes in institutions, policy and infrastructure due to convergence of the 
respective variables to the benchmark level we first calculate the difference between the 
benchmark value ( B VAR ) and the actual value ( a VAR ) of the variable and then multiply it by the 




() () 100 * )) 1 * var (exp
) 1 * var ((exp  
− −
+ − − =
a B j
a B i a
VAR VAR COEF
VAR VAR COEF Gain Trade
 
For policy and institutions, the average score for the EU15 in 2004 is used as one benchmark. As 
an alternative benchmark for institutions, the EU15 average score is taken in 2008. Infrastructure 
is compared with four North African countries. Since the latter are expected to have poorer 
infrastructure than the CIS or SEE, we rearrange the difference: ( a VAR - B VAR ).  
The trade gain for the whole regional bloc is estimated as the simple average of the individual 
trade gains for the member countries. 
Gains from WTO or FTA membership or a reduction in exchange rate volatility are estimated 
as the average gain obtained from the regression multiplied by the corresponding trade share: 





















100 * 1 * exp   , 
where K is a bloc composed of n countries trading with m member countries of the WTO, the 
FTA or the euro area. 
Since exchange rate volatility has a negative impact on trade we reverse 1 and exp(.) in (A2) to 
compute the gains from a decrease in exchange rate volatility. In other words, we calculate the 
trade gain from setting the exchange rate volatility between the EU12 and CEE to zero. We use 
the average volatility over the whole sample and the whole period. The average trade gain is then 
multiplied by the ratio of CEE trade with the euro area to total CEE trade in 2004. 
The impact of EU enlargement on selected non-member states is assessed for two waves, those 
of 2004 and 2007. After the 2004 wave of EU enlargement, the selected countries (Belarus, 
Moldova, Ukraine, Croatia and Serbia), with the exception of Moldova, become “bordering” 
countries with the EU. Therefore, the number of borders to cross and the common border between 
the above countries and the EU25 are set to 1. For Moldova, variable contig is 0, and the number 
of borders is set to 2. After the 2007 wave of EU enlargement, with Romania and Bulgaria’s 
accession, Moldova obtained a border with the EU, and the variables contig and nbordersij were 
adjusted accordingly. The trade gain for an individual country a is estimated as the ratio of the 
sum of the exponents of the predicted values of trade with all partners, estimated with modified 
contig and nbordersij variables, to the sum of the exponents of the predicted values of trade with 
all partners, based on the regression results: 26   Oxana Babecká Kucharčuková, Jan Babecký and Martin Raiser 
 





































Gain Trade  
Trade potential for the five Central Asia (CA5) countries is estimated as the ratio of actual to 
potential trade. Potential trade is estimated as the sum of the exponents of the linear prediction 
(PREDICT) obtained from regression 2 (Table 2). The predicted value is calculated for each pair 



























Potential Trade  
where Asia S Asia E S E j CA a . or    . . & .     , 5   ∈ ∈ . If actual trade is missing, potential trade is not 
reported.  
Simulations are performed based on 2004 values for the macroeconomic variables, using the 
significant regression coefficients from specification 4, Table 2. The impact of EU enlargement is 
simulated for the rounds of 2004 and 2007. The impact of institutional quality is assessed using 
the EU15 average scores for 2004 and 2008.  
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